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Abstract
During the African American Great Migration, millions of blacks left the Southern USA
in favor of cities in the North. Despite the social and economic consequences of this
migration, the question of its impacts on labor markets in the North has largely been
overlooked in the literature. In this paper, I use both local wage comparisons and
structural simulations of the aggregate Northern labor market to provide new evidence
on the effects of the Great Migration on wages in the North, redoubling the evidence
that it caused large declines in wages for blacks, with little effect for whites. The
agreement between my local and aggregate wage effect estimates has implications for
our general understanding of how immigration and wages are related and how that
relationship can be measured.
JEL Classification: J15, J61, R23, N32, N92
Keywords: Migration, Immigration, Internal migration, Great Migration, Local labor
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1 Introduction
During the African American Great Migration, millions of blacks left their places of
birth in the Southern USA in favor of cities in the North. By drastically redistribut-
ing the black, this large and prolonged internal migration played an important role in
shaping the economic and cultural history of the modern USA.1 In particular, Smith
and Welch (1989) show that the Great Migration was integral to the wage gains that
blacks made relative to whites during much of the twentieth century (also see Donohue
and Heckman 1991; Smith and Welch 1978). Despite its wide-reaching cultural and
economic significance, the literature on the Great Migration has largely overlooked its
implications for receiving cities in the North, focussing instead on the Great Migrants
themselves. An exception is Boustan (2009), who finds that the Great Migration put
downward pressure on the wages of blacks living in the North, with little effect on whites’
wages there.
This paper redoubles the evidence on the effects of the Great Migration on wages in
the North. My findings broadly support those in Boustan (2009), though they suggest that
the Great Migration may have decreased the wages of Northern blacks more than pre-
viously thought. Importantly, I estimate similar effects using both a local labor markets
approach that compares wages among areas with different amounts of Southern immi-
gration and a structural, national labor market approach that combines the estimated
parameters of the aggregate production function in the North with observed immigration
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in order to simulate the wage effects of the Great Migration. The robustness of my
findings to different methodological approaches adds credibility to the estimates and to
our understanding of the consequences of the Great Migration.
In addition to shoring up the literature on the effects of the Great Migration on the
North, these findings are of some significance to the broader literature on the relationship
between migration (both foreign and internal) and wages. Studies of foreign immigra-
tion to the USA have not come to a strong consensus on how contemporary immigrant
flows have affected natives’ wages. In general, local labor markets studies tend to find
smaller effects (see, for example, Altonji and Card 1991; Card 1990, 2001, 2009) while
national labor market studies tend to find larger effects (see, for example, Borjas 2003,
2006; Borjas et al. 2010). The literature has identified a number of confounding fac-
tors that may explain why studies taking different methodological approaches come
to different conclusions. These factors were less common during the Great Migration
period, making it a useful backdrop against which to analyze the relationship between
immigration and wages.
The most prominent of these explanations is the spatial arbitrage hypothesis, which
holds that natives respond to immigrant inflows by migrating internally, attenuating
between-labor-market supply shocks, and consequently, estimates of the wage effects of
immigration that are based on geographic comparisons; empirical tests of this hypothe-
sis have come to conflicting conclusions (cf. Borjas 2006; Card 2001; Card and DiNardo
2000; Peri and Sparber 2011). During the Great Migration period, blacks living in the
North were clustered into a small number of metropolitan areas, effectively limiting their
ability to move in response to inflows of Southern immigrants.2 While I find evidence of
a white outmigration response to Southern immigration, I find no such response among
blacks living in theNorth. Because I also find evidence of considerable separation between
the black and white labor markets in the North, this finding implies that internal migra-
tion within theNorth did not arbitrage away Southern-immigration-induced relative local
labor supply shocks for blacks.3
Another potential explanation for the divergence between the results of local and
national immigration studies is that inflows of foreign immigrants to the contemporary
USA do not alter the skill distribution in a way that affects natives’ wages in the long run.
For example, Card (2009) argues that, since the immigrant and native skill distributions
are similar for appropriately defined measures of skill, immigration has had little effect
on the relative wage structure. Similarly, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) argue that imperfect
substitution between US natives and foreign immigrants, which concentrates the wage
impacts of immigration on immigrants themselves, can explain why structural national
labor market studies that assume perfect substitution find larger wage impacts for natives.
Analysis of the Great Migration does not suffer from these limitations. I provide evi-
dence that, while within education-experience-race groups, Southern immigrants were
perfectly substitutable for Northern natives during this period, blacks and whites were
not. Consequently, the overwhelmingly black inflow of Southern immigrants changed the
skill distribution in the North appreciably. Furthermore, over half of the black popula-
tion in the North was Southern-born by 1950, implying large proportional shocks to the
supply of black labor in the North with which to measure the wage effects of immigra-
tion (and by virtue of the separation between the black and white labor markets, with the
potential to generate relatively large effects).
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The labor market effects of the Great Migration are, like those of any immigration
episode, idiosyncratic to its historical circumstances. The location decision faced by
blacks born in the Southern USA, for example, differed from those faced by potential
foreign immigrants to the contemporary USA; the imperfect substitution that I estimate,
for another, was likely due at least in part to racial discrimination. Conclusions about
the effects of the Great Migration may still be informative about those of contempo-
rary immigration. Just as each immigration episode will impact labor markets differently,
depending on the characteristics of its migrants, receiving location, macroeconomic envi-
ronment, etc., the effects identified by each analysis will be specific to the episode under
study. However, each new analysis helps complete our picture of the relationship between
immigration and wages.
2 Local labor markets analysis
2.1 Data and summary statistics
The analysis in this section uses data drawn from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) extracts of the 1940 and 1950 US Censuses (Ruggles et al. 2015). These data
contain detailed information on wage income and residential location, as well as a host
of demographic and economic variables. To my knowledge, they are the earliest data that
contain rich wage and geographic information for the Great Migration period. I restrict
the sample to US-born black and white men of working age and living in the North at the
time of enumeration. I use the Eichenlaub et al. (2010) definition of the North and obtain
similar results when the foreign born are included in the sample. I define local labor mar-
kets as Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). Further details regarding the construction
of the sample and the variables used in the empirical analysis are available in Appendix 1.
Table 1 presents summary evidence on the amount of immigration from the Southern
USA. Southern immigrants comprised about 8 % of the Northern labor force by 1940
and 10 % by 1950, comparable to the foreign-immigrant fraction of the modern US labor
force. This immigrant flow was heavily skewed towards blacks relative to the Northern
native labor force. Southern immigrants made up over 60 % of the black labor force in
the North in both decades, compared to less than 10 % of the white labor force. Although
the large proportion of Southern-born blacks who migrated North, and the effect of their
emigration on the size of the black labor force in the North, made the Great Migration
“great,” accounts of the GreatMigration often overlook the fact that more Southern whites
moved than blacks, with Southern whites accounting for more than 5 % of the Northern
labor force, compared to only 3–4 % for blacks. The period that I study is part of the sec-
ond wave of the Great Migration, which spanned roughly 1940–1970 (see Tolnay (2003)
for details on the extent of Southern immigration between the full 1910–1970 period).
Table 1 also gives a sense of when these immigrants arrived. In 1940, for example, less
than 2 % of the Northern labor force consisted of Southern-born blacks who still resided
in the South as of 1935. This suggests that the local labor markets estimates below identify
a combination of long- and short-run effects of immigration.
Figure 1 plots the immigrant share of the black labor force against the share of the
white labor force for Northern metropolitan areas. As the figure shows, there was sub-
stantial overlap between the destinations of black and white immigrants from the South.
Table 2 compares the education distribution for natives and immigrants to the North.
Southern immigrants are slightly overrepresented at lower levels of education and slightly
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Table 1 Immigration by race and year
Prop. Southern (1940)
Entire labor force 0.079 0.101
(0.001) (0.001)
Black labor force 0.632 0.661
(0.005) (0.008)
White labor force 0.054 0.068
(0.001) (0.001)
Prop. Black and Southern
Entire labor force 0.027 0.036
(0.000) (0.001)
Prop. White and Southern
Entire labor force 0.052 0.065
(0.001) (0.001)
% Recent Southern 1940 (5 years ago) 1950 (1 year ago)
Entire labor force 0.017 0.006
(0.000) (0.000)
Black labor force 0.052 0.008
(0.003) (0.001)
White labor force 0.015 0.006
(0.000) (0.000)
Notes: The labor force is defined as black and white men aged 16–64 who reported nonzero earnings in the year of enumeration.
“Southern” means born in the South. Standard errors in parentheses
underrepresented at higher levels, particularly among blacks. However, the overall distri-
butions are similar for both races and all years.4 For this reason, I focus my analysis on
race-specific average, rather than within-skill-group, effects.
2.2 Empirical strategy
To apply the local labor markets approach to the Great Migration, I estimate a series of
linear models that relate individuals’ log wages to the immigrant share of the labor force
in the metropolitan area where they live. A threat to the validity of this approach is that
Southern immigrants were not randomly assigned to labor markets in the North. It is pos-
sible, for example, that immigrants selected into areas where wages were higher, perhaps
due to productivity or demand shocks, in which case my estimates of the wage impacts
of immigration would be attenuated. The standard solution to this problem, first used
by Altonji and Card (1991), is to predict immigration according to historical immigrant
settlement patterns, then use these predictions to instrument for observed immigration.
This strategy draws on work by Bartel (1989), who shows that successive waves of immi-
grants tend to move to the same areas, a phenomenon which has also been documented
among the Great Migrants (Tolnay 2003). Altonji and Card (1991) argue that this enclav-
ing behavior provides a source of variation in immigration that is uncorrelated with the
contemporary economic conditions of local labor markets.5
To exploit this variation, I predict the immigrant fraction pjt of the labor force in area
j and decade t using pˆjt = μj20Mt/Njt , where μj20 is the fraction of all Southern immi-
grants who resided in area j in 1920, Mt is the total number of Southerners living in
the North in decade t, and Njt is the total population of area j in decade t.6 I then use
the predicted immigrant shares pˆjt as instruments for the observed shares pjt . In some
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 1 Southern immigrant shares of the black and white labor force. Notes: Each point represents an MSA.
a, b For 1940, the slope of the regression line is 0.16; for 1950, it is 0.13. The corresponding correlation
coefficients are 0.42 and 0.32
of the specifications that I estimate, I replace the overall immigrant fraction of the labor
force with the fractions comprised of black and, separately, white Southerners, in which
case the instruments are constructed by replacing the components of the pˆjt with their
race-specific counterparts. Figure 2 plots, separately by decade and race, the immigrant
share of the labor force against predictions of that share based on 1920 settlement pat-
terns. The figure shows that immigration predicted from historical settlement patterns is
strongly correlated with actual immigration. The formal first-stage regressions, presented
in Appendix 3: Table 19, support this conclusion, showing that predicted immigration has
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Table 2 Education by race, year and immigrant status
Black White
Year Education group Northern Southern Northern Southern
1940 Less than 5th grade 0.10 0.16 0.02 0.05
5th–8th grade 0.48 0.56 0.39 0.44
Some high school 0.23 0.15 0.23 0.21
High school degree 0.12 0.08 0.22 0.17
Greater than high school 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.13
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1950 Less than 5th grade 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.04
5th–8th grade 0.34 0.45 0.27 0.35
Some high school 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.24
High school degree 0.21 0.13 0.29 0.21
Greater than high school 0.11 0.05 0.18 0.15
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1960 Less than 5th grade 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.04
5th–8th grade 0.25 0.36 0.18 0.28
Some high school 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.25
High school degree 0.27 0.19 0.32 0.25
Greater than high school 0.13 0.09 0.24 0.19
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: Standard errors for the estimated proportions, each of which is less than .01, suppressed
substantial power to explain the overall and race-specific immigrant shares of Northern
labor markets in both the black and white regression samples.
Although the 1920 settlement patterns of Southern immigrants are necessarily uncor-
related with economic conditions that were idiosyncratic to the 1930s and 1940s in the
North, instrumental variable estimates based on predicted migration patterns may still be
inconsistent if metro-average wages are serially correlated and immigrants were attracted
to areas that paid high wages in 1920. I take several steps to account for this possibility. To
control for the local determinants of wages, I estimate specifications that include a full set
of indicators for age and education, as well as themetro-level shares of the black and white
populations employed in manufacturing, the shares living on farms, and metro-average
education among blacks and whites. In addition, for the 1950 regression samples, I am
able to includemetro-average wages in 1940 as a covariate (this is not possible for the 1940
samples since the Census did not ask wage questions prior to 1940). If local wages follow a
lagged dependent variable structure, including lagged average wages completely accounts
for any residual correlation between wages and 1920 settlement patterns. In Appendix 1,
I show that including these lags can also mitigate the inconsistency that would arise if
wages follow a fixed-effects, rather than a lagged dependent variable, structure, although I
also present some evidence that a lagged model fits the data better. Lagged average wages
may also proxy for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity and control for any direct and
lasting effect that 1920 immigration had on local wages. The models that include lagged
metro-average wages should be interpreted as identifying a combination of the short- to
medium-run effects of immigrant inflows and lasting effects of existing stocks of immi-
grants.7 Because each specification models wages as a function of the overall immigrant
share of the local labor force, they identify the total effect of Southern immigration on
each racial group’s wages.8
Gardner IZA Journal of Migration  (2016) 5:22 Page 7 of 45
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2 a, b Actual and predicted immigration. Notes: Each point represents an MSA
2.3 Wage impact results
Table 3 presents estimates of the impact of Southern immigration on the annual wages
(all wage income earned in the year preceding enumeration) of native Northerners.
The entries in the table are estimates of the coefficient on the immigrant share of the
metropolitan area labor force from models that regress individual log wages on this share
and other covariates. I estimate separate regressions for each racial group and Census
year. For the 1940 Census samples, I estimate two specifications. Specification (1) includes
individual education and age indicators as covariates; specification (2) adds the metro-









Table 3 Annual wages and immigration
OLS IV
1940 1950 1940 1950
Specification Black White Black White Black White Black White
(1) Prop. Southern 0.152 0.0363 −0.661** 0.367 −0.110 −0.178 −1.116*** 0.394
(0.207) (0.380) (0.313) (0.270) (0.394) (0.386) (0.324) (0.276)
Observations 2107 107,149 1043 41,154 2081 104,029 1029 39,219
Clusters 27 93 23 100 26 80 22 80
(2) Prop. Southern −0.243 0.329 −0.948** 0.475** −0.774*** 0.379 −1.369*** 0.367
(0.298) (0.261) (0.411) (0.220) (0.280) (0.245) (0.507) (0.313)
Observations 2107 104,209 1043 37,433 2081 101,339 1029 36,413
Clusters 27 87 23 72 26 75 22 62
(3) Prop. Southern −1.185*** 0.162 −1.827*** 0.301
(0.343) (0.200) (0.273) (0.251)
Observations 1043 39,316 1029 38,078
Clusters 23 87 22 75
(4) Prop. Southern −1.245*** 0.210** −2.269*** 0.104
(0.291) (0.0993) (0.546) (0.225)
Observations 1043 36,473 1029 35,644
Clusters 23 67 22 59
Notes: All specifications include indicators for age and education; specification (2) includes white and black metro-level percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of education; specification (3) includes
the metro level average dependent variable, lagged one decade; specification (4) includes metro-level average variables and a lagged mean dependent variable. Regressions weighted by the number of observations used to calculate
metro-level covariates. Standard errors, clustered by metro area, reported in parentheses
“***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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estimate specifications (3) and (4), which add lagged metro-average log wages to specifi-
cations (1) and (2). The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are presented in the left
panel of Table 3. In the 1940 sample, none of the estimated coefficients on the proportion
Southern are statistically significant, although the point estimate is negative for blacks in
specification (2). In the 1950 sample, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant
in each specification for blacks and becomes larger in absolute value as more covariates
are added to the model, a pattern consistent with selection into high-wage metropolitan
areas. The coefficient on the proportion Southern is positive in all of the models esti-
mated for whites, though it is not always statistically significant. The right panel of the
table presents the instrumental variables (IV) estimates. For blacks, each IV estimate of
the coefficient on the proportion Southern is larger in absolute value than its correspond-
ing OLS estimate, also consistent with selection into high-wage areas. With the exception
of specification (1) in 1940, the estimated coefficient is negative for blacks in every spec-
ification, exhibiting the same pattern of a larger absolute effect as additional covariates
are added to the model. For the richest specification (specification (4), estimated using
the 1950 sample), the estimate implies that a 10 % increase in the immigrant share of the
labor force decreased annual wages among native blacks by about 23 %. For whites, most
of the point estimates are positive and, although the estimates aremore precise than those for
blacks, the hypothesis that Southern immigration had no effect onwages can never be rejected.
Note that, while the wage variable used in these regressions varies at the individual
level, the immigrant share varies only across metropolitan areas.9 While the cluster-
ing of blacks into a small number of metropolitan areas in the North is advantageous
from the standpoint of concern about spatial arbitrage, it implies that the wage effects
for blacks are identified from limited variation in local immigrant shares. As a conse-
quence, the black regression results, particularly those for the 1950 samples in which
only a subset of individuals were asked wage information, should be interpreted with
some caution. However, the reported standard errors are clustered at the metropolitan
area, and the estimates are very similar to those obtained by regressing metro-average
residual (from regressions of log annual wages on individual covariates) wages on metro-
level immigrant shares and covariates (these regressions are presented in Appendix 3:
Table 17).10 Below, I also show that the individual-level regressions are robust to a
number of tests designed to assess their sensitivity to outliers and the use of different
estimation samples.
The estimates in Table 3 should be viewed as general equilibrium impacts that combine
the effects of own- and cross-race immigration. In order to decompose these impacts, I
replicate specifications (1)–(4), allowing the fractions of the local labor force consisting of
Southern blacks and Southern whites to enter separately. Table 4 presents the estimates.
Both the OLS and IV estimates suggest that the negative effect of immigration evident
for blacks is driven primarily by competition between Northern-born blacks and black
immigrants from the South. For native blacks’ wages, the OLS estimates of the coeffi-
cients on the proportion Southern black are all negative, while those on the proportion
Southern white are either positive or smaller in absolute value (none are statistically sig-
nificant). The IV estimates of the coefficients on the proportion Southern black are larger
in absolute value than the OLS estimates and uniformly statistically significant. The coef-
ficients on the proportion Southern white are small and, in most cases, insignificant. The









Table 4 Annual wages and race-specific immigration
OLS IV
1940 1950 1940 1950
Specification Black White Black White Black White Black White
(1) Prop. Southern black −0.486 1.943*** −0.702 1.750*** −1.504* 0.708 −2.917** 0.946*
(0.769) (0.493) (1.161) (0.279) (0.837) (0.883) (1.245) (0.519)
Prop. Southern white 0.483 −0.579** −0.638 −0.265* 0.730 −0.739** −0.00155 −0.285*
(0.416) (0.242) (0.401) (0.136) (0.585) (0.301) (0.606) (0.171)
Observations 2107 107,149 1043 41,154 2081 104,029 1029 39,219
Clusters 27 93 23 100 26 80 22 80
(2) Prop. Southern black −1.905 2.151*** −1.920 1.764*** −4.806*** 1.734*** −2.265* 0.914*
(1.256) (0.374) (1.482) (0.353) (1.583) (0.384) (1.351) (0.483)
Prop. Southern white 0.385 −0.530** −0.535 −0.229 1.049* −0.557*** −0.646 −0.167
(0.472) (0.206) (0.576) (0.189) (0.580) (0.208) (0.439) (0.268)
Observations 2107 104,209 1043 37,433 2081 101,339 1029 36,413
Clusters 27 87 23 72 26 75 22 62
(3) Prop. Southern black −1.086 1.330*** −2.659*** 0.787**
(0.981) (0.259) (0.556) (0.325)
Prop. Southern white −1.241*** −0.262*** −1.311** −0.272*
(0.381) (0.0920) (0.529) (0.141)
Observations 1043 39,316 1029 38,078
Clusters 23 87 22 75
(4) Prop. Southern black −5.203*** 0.845** −5.437*** 0.101
(1.163) (0.393) (1.497) (0.422)
Prop. Southern white −0.0541 −0.0360 −0.127 0.106
(0.516) (0.161) (0.487) (0.220)
Observations 1043 36,473 1029 35,644
Clusters 23 67 22 59
Notes: All specifications include indicators for age and education; specification (2) includes white and black metro-level percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of education; specification (3) includes
the metro level average dependent variable, lagged one decade; specification (4) includes metro-level average variables and a lagged mean dependent variable. Regressions weighted by the number of observations used to calculate
metro-level covariates. Standard errors, clustered by metro area, reported in parentheses
“***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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increased proportion of the Northern labor force comprised of Southern blacks to 3.6 %
by 1950, decreased native blacks’ wages by about 15 %.
For native whites, the evidence is somewhat mixed. Both the OLS and IV estimates
suggest a weak positive effect of black immigration on the wages of Northern-born whites,
although this effect disappears in the IV estimate of specification (4), which includes the
most covariates. At the same time, there is some evidence of a negative own-race effect
for whites, with the coefficients on the white immigrant share of the labor force uniformly
negative. However, these coefficients are never statistically significant when metro-level
covariates are included. The estimates for whites also suggest that the apparent negative
effect of immigration on the wages of native blacks cannot be explained by selection into
low-wage areas: the coefficients on the black immigrant share variables are all positive,
consistent with a either positive cross-race effects of immigration or selection into high-
wage areas, but not selection into low-wage areas.
I also estimate models of the impact of immigration on weekly wages (annual
wages divided by weeks worked). The overall and race-specific estimates, presented in
Appendix 3: Tables 20 and 21, are similar to the annual wage results: Southern immi-
gration put substantial downward pressure on native blacks’ wages, an effect driven by
competition from black immigrants, with no discernible impact on whites’ wages. The
key difference between the annual and weekly estimates is that the magnitudes of the
effects of immigration on blacks’ weekly wages are much smaller. In the 1950 sample, for
example, the coefficient on the (overall) proportion Southern for specification (4), which
includes the full set of covariates, is about−1.3, compared to about−2.3 for annual wages.
This difference, which implies that adjustments along the intensive margin of labor supply
were an important part of the response of local labor markets to Southern immigration,
helps explain the magnitude of the estimated annual wage elasticities. The prominence of
adjustments along this margin also raises the possibility that both the annual and weekly
wage estimates understate the true impact of Southern immigration, which may have
caused some natives to exit the labor force, and consequently, my estimation samples.
These wage impact estimates suggest that black and white labor were, effectively,
imperfect substitutes during the sample period. Under perfect substitution, the effects
of overall, own-, and cross-race immigration would be the same for each racial group.
Instead, there is a large black-white disparity in the estimated impact of overall immigra-
tion, a robustly negative effect of own-race immigration on native blacks’ wages, and only
tenuous, specification-sensitive evidence of an own-race effect for native whites or cross-
race effects for either group. This pattern cannot be explained by outmigration; under
perfect substitution, these effects would be symmetric regardless of whether outmigration
attenuated relative local labor supply shocks. Nor can it be explained by measurement
error in the construction of local immigrant shares, which Aydemir and Borjas (2011)
show can attenuate local labor markets estimates. The estimated effect of black immi-
gration on native blacks’ wages is substantially larger than the cross-race effect even
though the black samples are smaller than the white ones and therefore likely to be more
error-ridden. This implies that, to the extent that my estimates are attenuated bymeasure-
ment error, the underlying own-race effect for blacks must be larger than the cross-race
effect.
Because Southern immigrants were disproportionately black relative to the native labor
force, segmentation between the markets for black and white labor in the North would
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have concentrated the effects of immigration on blacks. A simple measure of the sep-
aration between these markets is the correlation between black and white employment
shares within industry-occupation cells throughout the North. This correlation, which
does not reflect segregation at lower levels of aggregation, was .65 in 1940 and .41 in 1950.
In the next section, I provide direct evidence of imperfect substitution: treating the entire
North as an aggregate labor market, I estimate a finite elasticity of substitution between
blacks and whites. The wage regressions, employment share correlations and structural
elasticity estimates imply that black and white labor were utilized as though they were
imperfectly substitutable, though this effective imperfect substitution may not have been
due to actual productivity differences. Discrimination against blacks, for example, may
have caused occupational segregation that prevented the substitution of black for white
labor. Racial differences in educational attainment, and educational quality conditional
on attainment, may have also rendered blacks and whites imperfect substitutes. Boustan
(2009) finds that controlling for measures of educational quality can explain two thirds of
the apparent imperfect substitution.
2.4 Native outmigration results
As discussed in the introduction, if natives move to different labor markets in order to
avoid competition from immigrants, immigration-induced labor supply shocks will be
distributed across many labor markets, as will the effect of these shocks on wages. As
a consequence, estimates of the impact of immigration on wages based on comparisons
between local labor markets will be attenuated. Note that the possibility of spatial arbi-
trage among native blacks during the Great Migration is less troubling since the wage
regressions reveal an appreciable effect of immigration. At worst, these regressions iden-
tify an upper bound on the underlying impact of Southern immigration on blacks’ wages.
On the other hand, these regressions do not suggest an own-race effect for whites or
any cross-race effects. It is possible that outmigration arbitraged away local differences in
these effects, even if they were present at an aggregate level in the North.
To test for outmigration, I model the propensity of natives to change locales in response
to Southern immigration. Both the 1940 and 1950 Censuses provide information on indi-
viduals’ recent migration behavior. The 1940 data give the metropolitan area of residence
5 years prior to enumeration while the 1950 data give the area of residence 1 year prior.
For each Census decade and racial group, I regress an indicator for leaving one’s pre-
Census metropolitan area on the recent immigrant share of the local labor force (the
number of Southerners living in the metropolitan area at the time of the Census but not
in the pre-Census period as a fraction of the area’s pre-Census population). Specifica-
tion (1) includes age and education indicators as covariates; specification (2) includes the
contemporaneous metro-average covariates used in the wage regressions and described
above.11
Table 5 presents the results of this exercise. The top panel of the table contains estimates
of the coefficient on the proportion Southern. The OLS estimates provide some evidence
of outmigration among native whites in 1940, inmigration among native blacks in that
decade, and little evidence of outmigration among natives of either race in 1950. The IV
estimates, which use the same instrument as the wage regressions, show a clear pattern
of outmigration for whites in 1940 but no evidence of black outmigration in any decade









Table 5 Native outmigration and recent immigration
OLS IV
1940 1950 1940 1950
Black White Black White Black White Black White
Overall
Specification
(1) Prop. Southern −0.428 0.343*** −0.784 0.423 −0.0468 1.101*** −0.219 0.513
(0.351) (0.102) (1.149) (0.315) (0.267) (0.346) (0.277) (0.757)
Observations 2018 97,043 954 38,073 1996 94,370 940 36,456
Clusters 27 92 21 97 26 79 20 79
(2) Prop. Southern −0.580*** −0.0283 0.411 −0.304 0.223 0.725*** 0.295 1.356
(0.187) (0.0223) (1.091) (0.313) (0.609) (0.215) (2.028) (0.876)
Observations 2018 94,512 954 34,942 1996 92,054 940 34,055
Clusters 27 86 21 70 26 74 20 61
By race
Specification
(1) Prop. Southern black 0.250 −1.165 −2.655** −0.679 1.506 2.440 1.854 −2.992
(1.119) (0.956) (1.248) (0.958) (3.607) (2.420) (5.019) (3.348)
Prop. Southern white −0.472 0.728*** 0.826 1.051*** −0.593 0.794*** −1.167 2.340***
(0.404) (0.206) (0.592) (0.369) (1.011) (0.295) (1.993) (0.853)
Observations 2018 97,043 954 38,073 1996 94,370 940 36,456
Clusters 27 92 21 97 26 79 20 79
(2) Prop. Southern black 0.349 −0.589 −2.735 −0.290 7.386 0.558 2.627 −0.157
(2.669) (0.586) (2.155) (1.290) (6.773) (1.532) (4.570) (3.247)
Prop. Southern white −0.603* 0.492*** −0.319 0.527 −1.697 0.769** −1.193 2.125***
(0.307) (0.152) (1.287) (0.438) (1.128) (0.361) (1.562) (0.723)
Observations 2018 94,512 954 34,942 1996 92,054 940 34,055
Clusters 27 86 21 70 26 74 20 61
Notes: All specifications include indicators for age and education; specification (2) includes white and black metro-level percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of education. Regressions weighted by
the number of observations used to calculate metro-level covariates. Standard errors, clustered by metro area, reported in parentheses
“***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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the table contains estimates of the coefficients on race-specific immigrant shares. Con-
sistent with imperfect substitution between black and white labor, both the OLS and IV
estimates show that white outmigration was a response to Southern white immigration.
In particular, in the white samples, each IV estimate of the coefficient on the proportion
Southern white is positive and statistically significant, while none of the coefficients on
the proportion Southern black are. None of the estimates evince outmigration by native
blacks.
Since some of the outmigration that took place from 1935 to 1940 and 1949 to 1950
was likely in response to competition from immigrants who arrived before these peri-
ods began, the estimates in Table 5 may overstate native whites’ outmigration response.12
This effect may be less pronounced in the 1940 samples since a longer period of obser-
vation is more likely to capture natives’ response to recent immigration. For example, the
specification (2) IV estimate of the white outmigration response to white immigration is
2.13 in the 1950 sample, while the 1940 estimate of .77 is more reasonable, though it still
implies a considerable outmigration response.
In summary, there is no evidence of black outmigration, but strong evidence of a native
white response to Southern white immigration. My local labor markets estimates of the
impact of Southern immigration on native blacks’ wages are therefore unattenuated by
spatial arbitrage. Although my estimates do not suggest that outmigration among native
whites completely offset incoming Southern whites, the possibility remains that spatial
arbitrage obscures an own-race effect for whites or cross-race effects for both groups (e.g.,
if inflows of whites combined with black-white imperfect substitution put upward pres-
sure on blacks’ wages). Since immigration only increased the supply of white labor in the
North modestly, the underlying wage impacts may have been small and difficult to detect
even absent outmigration, making the influence of spatial arbitrage on my estimates for
whites unclear. However, the national labor market analysis below results in similarly
small cross-race and white own-race effect estimates, suggesting that spatial arbitrage
does not explain why the white wage regression coefficients are small.13
2.5 Robustness and sensitivity tests
The instrumental variable estimates presented so far have been based on the total frac-
tion of each metropolitan area’s labor force comprised of Southern immigrants in 1920.
That is, they are based on the propensity of Southerners to migrate to areas where other
Southerners have gone. Although predicted immigrant shares based on these settlement
patterns are strongly related to actual shares, a more compelling behavioral story might
be that immigrants originating from a particular locale prefer to migrate to areas where
others from that locale have moved. I also estimate models that instrument for immi-
gration using shares predicted from state-specific historical settlement patterns. I predict
the decade-t fraction of the labor force in area j comprised of Southern immigrants using
pˆjt = ∑k μkj20Mkt/Njt , whereμkj20 is the fraction of immigrants from state k that resided
in metropolitan area j in 1920, Mkt is the number of immigrants originating from k in t,
andNjt is the population of area j in decade t. Using these state-specificmigration patterns
does not substantively change the results. The annual wage effect estimates, presented in
Table 6, show that immigration decreased blacks’ wages, that this decrease was a conse-
quence of competition from Southern black immigrants, and that whites’ wages were not









Table 6 Annual wages and immigration: state-specific IV estimates
Overall By race
1940 1950 1940 1950
Specification Black White Black White Black White Black White
(1) Prop. Southern −0.308 −0.448 −1.134*** 0.269 Prop. Southern black −2.212* 0.584 −2.443** 1.155**
(0.494) (0.394) (0.307) (0.288) (1.160) (0.834) (1.112) (0.503)
Observations 2081 104,029 1029 39,219 Prop. Southern white 0.694 −0.841*** −0.347 −0.303**
Clusters 26 80 22 80 (0.765) (0.291) (0.545) (0.149)
Observations 2081 104,029 1029 39,219
Clusters 26 80 22 80
(2) Prop. Southern −0.804*** 0.121 −1.348*** 0.325 Prop. Southern black −4.391*** 1.518*** −2.803* 1.091**
(0.307) (0.259) (0.365) (0.308) (1.325) (0.419) (1.522) (0.460)
Observations 2081 101,339 1029 36,413 Prop. Southern white 0.809* −0.644*** −0.640 −0.195
Clusters 26 75 22 62 (0.486) (0.219) (0.444) (0.276)
Observations 2081 101,339 1029 36,413
Clusters 26 75 22 62
(3) Prop. Southern −1.570*** 0.260 Prop. Southern black −2.057*** 1.067***
(0.233) (0.198) (0.702) (0.309)
Observations 1 029 38,078 Prop. Southern white −1.300*** −0.240*
Clusters 22 75 (0.446) (0.125)
Observations 1029 38,078
Clusters 22 75
(4) Prop. Southern −1.650*** 0.244 Prop. Southern black −4.907*** 0.370
(0.331) (0.198) (1.335) (0.461)
Observations 1029 35,644 Prop. Southern white 0.0116 0.160
Clusters 22 59 (0.471) (0.195)
Observations 1029 35,644
Clusters 22 59
Notes: All specifications include indicators for age and education; specification (2) includes white and black metro-level percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of education; specification (3) includes
the metro level average dependent variable, lagged one decade; specification (4) includes metro-level average variables and a lagged mean dependent variable. Regressions weighted by the number of observations used to calculate
metro-level covariates. Standard errors, clustered by metro area, reported in parentheses
“***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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for blacks are larger in absolute value than the OLS estimates in Table 3, they are also
smaller than the IV estimates in that table, which are based on the 1920 settlement pat-
terns of all Southern immigrants. One explanation for this difference is that, if it is less
costly to migrate to closer areas, state-specific settlement patterns may partially identify
areas to which residents of a particular state are likely to move in response to transient
wage shocks. If so, historical settlement patterns for all Southerners will be less contami-
nated with selection effects since they better-identify migrations motivated by enclaving
behavior.14
Although 1920 settlement patterns are necessarily uncorrelated with the conditions of
local labor markets in the North that were idiosyncratic to 1940 and 1950, if 1920 immi-
grants systematically selected into Northern labor markets with above- or below-average
wages and the factors that determine local average wages are serially correlated, immi-
grant shares predicted from these settlement patterns may be spuriously correlated with
wages in future periods. In the wage regressions above, I account for this possibility by
estimating models that include lagged metro-average wages. The evidence presented so
far is consistent with selection into high wage areas: including covariates or instrument-
ing for immigration decreases the estimated wage effects, and the coefficients on the
proportion Southern black in the native white regression samples are positive. These pat-
terns also suggest that any remaining selection leads my wage regressions to understate
the effects of immigration, in which case they can be interpreted as upper bounds on the
underlying effects.
Since it is not clear a priori whether a lagged dependent variable structure or a fixed-
effects one provides a better description of the process that determines area-level wages
over time, I also pool the 1940 and 1950 data in order to estimate models that include
metropolitan area fixed effects. The estimates are presented in the top panel of Table 7.
Although including fixed effects reduces their precision, the estimates are consistent with
the previous wage regressions: immigration decreased wages for native blacks but had
no discernible effect on whites’ wages (note that the hypothesis of a positive effect can
be rejected for three of the four black IV regressions). The bottom panel of the table
contains estimates of regressions of decadal changes in metro-level mean residual wages
(i.e., after removing the variation explained by individual age and education) on decadal
changes in immigrant shares. The first-differenced models preserve the variation in the
area-level covariates explained by the individual-level covariates, increasing the precision
of the estimates, which are broadly similar to the fixed-effects estimates.
Both the fixed-effects and first-differenced estimates suggest much larger wage effects
for blacks than the decade-specific wage regressions discussed previously, although given
their standard errors they are also consistent with the main regression results presented
above. One explanation for this difference is that, because these models use the varia-
tion in changes in immigrant shares (rather than levels, as the decade-specific models
use), they identify the effects of recent immigration, which may be larger if labor markets
adapt to immigration over time, for example through endogenous adjustments to capital
stock or industrial composition. However, the magnitudes of the point estimates may also
indicate that the fixed-effects and first-differenced models are misspecified. As I show in
Appendix 1, if wages follow a lagged dependent variable structure, estimates of a misspec-
ified model that assumes a first-differenced/fixed-effects structure will be biased down.









Table 7 Fixed-effects and first-differenced models
OLS IV
Black White Black White
Fixed effects
Annual wages Prop. Southern −0.276 0.212 1.354*** 1.413*** −6.675* −3.420 −1.373 −0.862
(1.948) (1.345) (0.405) (0.299) (3.731) (5.360) (2.993) (4.749)
Observations 3150 3150 148,303 141,642 3110 3110 143,248 137,752
Clusters 29 29 100 92 28 28 80 78
Covariates N Y N Y N Y N Y
Weekly wages Prop. Southern −1.193 −0.488 0.847** 0.908*** −4.339 −6.411 −0.217 0.958
(0.839) (1.053) (0.366) (0.309) (2.817) (4.691) (1.680) (4.202)
Observations 3135 3135 147,855 141,232 3095 3095 142,825 (0.839)
Clusters 29 29 100 92 28 28 80 78
Covariates N Y N Y N Y N Y
First differences
Annual wages Prop. Southern −0.188 0.445 0.254 0.297 −9.796*** −7.385** 17.00 −6.143
(2.154) (2.150) (0.253) (0.372) (2.584) (2.905) (135.7) (8.574)
Observations 21 21 93 67 20 20 59 59
Covariates Y N Y N Y N Y N
Weekly wages Prop. Southern −0.144 0.154 0.0978 0.217 −5.490** −5.104** 15.35 −6.362
(1.261) (1.294) (0.190) (0.275) (2.215) (2.262) (122.0) (8.788)
Observations 21 21 93 67 20 20 59 59
Covariates Y N Y N Y N Y N
Notes: Covariates include white and black metro-level percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming and average years of education and well as indicators for age and educational attainment. The dependent variable for the
first-differenced models is the mean residual from a regression of wages on indicators for age and educational attainment. Standard errors for the fixed-effects estimates are clustered at the metro level, for the first-differenced
estimates they are heteroskedasticity robust
“***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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wage areas, future waves are attracted to areas with established enclaves, and wages are
mean reverting, areas with declining wages will receive more immigrants, inducing a spu-
rious correlation between changes in wages and changes in immigration. This possibility
makes the lagged dependent variable estimates, which can be interpreted conservatively
as upper bounds, preferable.
During the period that I study, blacks were clustered into a small number of metropoli-
tan areas in the North. For example, since the 1950 Census only asked wage questions
of a subset of households, my sample for that year is relatively small, containing only 22
metropolitan areas with at least ten native blacksmeeting the other selection criteria. This
clustering is advantageous from an identification standpoint since it eliminates concerns
about spatial arbitrage among blacks working in the North. However, since it also implies
that the effects of Southern immigration on blacks’ wages are identified from variation
across a limited number of labor markets, it also raises the concern that the estimated
effects are artifacts of a small number of outlying metropolitan areas. Figure 3, which
plots metro-average residual wages against residual immigration for blacks and whites in
1950, presents graphical evidence that this is not the case.15 These plots show that neither
group’s estimated effect is driven by outliers.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3 a, bMean residual wages and immigration in 1950. Notes: All variables are expressed as metro-area
mean residuals from regressions that include individual and metro-level covariates, as well as mean lagged
log annual wages. The IV plots use the projection of actual immigration onto its prediction according to 1920
settlement patterns on the x-axis
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A related concern is that the racial difference in the estimated effects of immigration is a
consequence of the dispersion of whites across more labor markets. For example, if whites
were more likely than blacks to live in areas where the effect of immigration was small,
the racial difference in the estimated wage effects could be due to sample selection. To
test for this, I replicate the white (annual) wage regressions, restricting the samples to the
same areas used to estimate the black wage regressions. The results, presented in Table 8,
show that this restriction does not eliminate the racial gap in wage impact estimates (note
that the results for blacks in this table are identical to the annual wage results for blacks
given in Tables 3 and 4). Table 9, which replicates the outmigration results using the same
sample restriction, shows that the estimated racial difference in outmigration behavior
cannot be explained by geographical heterogeneity, either.
As a further test of the influence of the clustering of the black population on my
estimates, I estimate wage and outmigration regressions using samples that include
Southern immigrants. Even if interest centers on the impacts of immigration on the entire
Northern labor force, there is as an argument for excluding immigrants from the estima-
tion samples. There may be labor-market-specific factors that affect immigrants’ wages
(e.g., if some areas are more receptive to immigrants) and the enclaving behavior that
justifies my instrumental variable strategy may arise because immigrants fare better in
areas where previous waves of immigrants have settled (e.g., if previous immigrants help
new ones find jobs; see White and Lindstrom (2005)). In either case, including immi-
grants in the estimation sample may introduce endogeneity between immigration and
wages. With this caveat in mind, the main advantage of including immigrants in the sam-
ples is that, since immigrants comprised over half of the Northern black labor force,
doing so increases the number of metropolitan areas that can be used to estimate the
effects of immigration. Table 10 presents the IV regression results for annual wages.
Including immigrants increases the number of metropolitan areas used for blacks from
26 to 47 in 1940 and from 22 to 33 in 1950. The magnitudes of the estimated effects
are smaller than when only natives are included in the sample, although they point
to the same broad conclusion as the native regressions—black immigration decreased
blacks’ wages and neither white nor black immigration affected whites’ wages. The out-
migration results, given in Table 11, are nearly identical to those obtained using only
natives.
I also estimate the annual wage regressions using two additional samples in order to
further assess the sensitivity of my results to the number of metropolitan areas included
in the regression samples (in the interest of brevity, I do not present these results, though
they are available upon request). The first sample includes both US- and foreign-born
men. Including the foreign born slightly increases the number of metropolitan areas in
the black regression samples (to 30 in 1940 and 23 in 1950), and the overall pattern of the
estimates is similar. The point estimates on the proportion Southern are slightly smaller,
possibly because foreign- born blacks are imperfect substitute for US-born blacks, and
therefore less affected by competition from Southern immigration. The second sam-
ple relaxes the exclusion of metropolitan areas with fewer than ten native born blacks
or whites. When this restriction is relaxed, the black wage regressions include observa-
tions from 87 metropolitan areas in 1940 and 72 areas in 1950. Because the additional
metropolitan areas contain few native blacks, the results are nearly identical to those









Table 8 Annual wages and immigration, same metro areas
Overall By race
1940 1950 1940 1950
Specification Black White Black White Black White Black White
(1) Prop. Southern −0.110 −0.422 −1.116*** 0.239 Prop. Southern black −1.504* −0.132 −2.917** 0.687
(0.394) (0.424) (0.324) (0.302) (0.837) (1.040) (1.245) (0.608)
Observations 2081 73,638 1029 26,562 Prop. Southern white 0.730 −0.598* −0.00155 −0.295
Clusters 26 26 22 22 (0.585) (0.354) (0.606) (0.195)
Observations 2081 73,638 1029 26,562
Clusters 26 26 22 22
(2) Prop. Southern −0.774*** 0.252 −1.369*** 0.164 Prop. Southern black −4.806*** 0.923 −2.265* 0.522
(0.280) (0.240) (0.507) (0.385) (1.583) (0.582) (1.351) (0.616)
Observations 2081 73,638 1029 26,562 Prop. Southern white 1.049* −0.0756 −0.646 −0.0986
Clusters 26 26 22 22 (0.580) (0.187) (0.439) (0.265)
Observations 2081 73,638 1029 26,562
Clusters 26 26 22 22
(3) Prop. Southern −1.827*** 0.316 Prop. Southern black −2.659*** 0.963***
(0.273) (0.318) (0.556) (0.324)
Observations 1029 26,562 Prop. Southern white −1.311** −0.357***
Clusters 22 22 (0.529) (0.131)
Observations 1029 26,562
Clusters 22 22
(4) Prop. Southern −2.269*** −0.0549 Prop. Southern black −5.437*** −0.398
(0.546) (0.241) (1.497) (0.678)
Observations 1029 26,562 Prop. Southern white −0.127 0.171
Clusters 22 22 (0.487) (0.184)
Observations 1029 26,562
Clusters 22 22
Notes: Instrumental variables estimates. All specifications include indicators for age and education; specification (2) includes white and black metro-level percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of
education; specification (3) includes the metro level average dependent variable, lagged one decade; specification (4) includes metro-level average variables and a lagged mean dependent variable. Regressions weighted by the
number of observations used to calculate metro-level covariates. Standard errors, clustered by metro area, reported in parentheses









Table 9 Native outmigration and recent immigration, same metro areas
Overall By race
1940 1950 1940 1950
Specification Black White Black White Black White Black White
(1) Prop. Southern −0.0468 1.214*** −0.219 0.572 Prop. Southern black 1.506 4.393 1.854 −2.366
(0.267) (0.394) (0.277) (0.804) (3.607) (3.363) (5.019) (3.320)
Observations 1996 68,564 940 24,704 Prop. Southern white −0.593 0.493* −1.167 2.173***
Clusters 26 26 20 20 (1.011) (0.299) (1.993) (0.824)
Observations 1996 68,564 940 24,704
Clusters 26 26 20 20
(2) Prop. Southern 0.223 0.768*** 0.295 1.355 Prop. Southern black 7.386 6.803 2.627 −0.254
(0.609) (0.226) (2.028) (1.013) (6.773) (5.551) (4.570) (3.497)
Observations 1996 68,564 940 24,704 Prop. Southern white −1.697 −0.597 −1.193 1.995***
Clusters 26 26 20 20 (1.128) (1.038) (1.562) (0.653)
Observations 1996 68,564 940 24,704
Clusters 26 26 20 20
Notes: Instrumental variables estimates. All specifications include indicators for age and education; specification (2) includes white and black metro-level percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of
education. Regressions weighted by the number of observations used to calculate metro-level covariates. Standard errors, clustered by metro area, reported in parentheses









Table 10 Annual wages and immigration, including Southern workers
Overall By race
1940 1950 1940 1950
Specification Black White Black White Black White Black White
(1) Prop. Southern −0.0649 −0.172 −0.567* 0.302 Prop. Southern black −0.653 0.788 −1.046 0.846*
(0.319) (0.364) (0.306) (0.257) (0.879) (0.809) (0.963) (0.511)
Observations 6849 109,298 3501 41,794 Prop. Southern white 0.274 −0.751*** −0.235 −0.314*
Clusters 47 80 33 80 (0.490) (0.286) (0.447) (0.162)
Observations 6849 109,298 3501 41,794
Clusters 47 80 33 80
(2) Prop. Southern −0.441* 0.361 −0.469* 0.293 Prop. Southern black −3.777*** 1.780*** −0.652 0.788
(0.228) (0.245) (0.285) (0.307) (1.076) (0.370) (0.806) (0.511)
Observations 6849 106,507 3501 38,906 Prop. Southern white 0.895*** −0.612*** −0.326 −0.165
Clusters 47 75 33 62 (0.338) (0.195) (0.352) (0.272)
Observations 6849 106,507 3501 38,906
Clusters 47 75 33 62
(3) Prop. Southern −0.880* 0.183 Prop. Southern black −0.891 0.649*
(0.466) (0.268) (0.645) (0.353)
Observations 3488 40,602 Prop. Southern white −0.874** −0.315**
Clusters 32 75 (0.442) (0.151)
Observations 3488 40,602
Clusters 32 75
(4) Prop. Southern −0.620** 0.0207 Prop. Southern black −1.731** −0.0630
(0.278) (0.213) (0.673) (0.445)
Observations 3488 38,104 Prop. Southern white 0.0790 0.0982
Clusters 32 59 (0.299) (0.224)
Observations 3488 38,104
Clusters 32 59
Notes: Instrumental variables estimates. All specifications include indicators for age and education; specification (2) includes white and black metro-level percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of
education; specification (3) includes the metro level average dependent variable, lagged one decade; specification (4) includes metro-level average variables and a lagged mean dependent variable. Regressions weighted by the
number of observations used to calculate metro-level covariates. Standard errors, clustered by metro area, reported in parentheses









Table 11 Outmigration and immigration, including Southern workers
Overall By race
1940 1950 1940 1950
Specification Black White Black White Black White Black White
(1) Prop. Southern 0.109 1.027*** −0.210 0.719 Prop. Southern black 0.205 2.146 −2.917 −1.985
(0.198) (0.341) (0.383) (0.860) (2.083) (2.236) (4.304) (3.736)
Observations 6335 98,378 3286 38,680 Prop. Southern white 0.0777 0.763*** 1.051 2.097**
Clusters 46 79 31 79 (0.519) (0.269) (1.566) (0.880)
Observations 6335 98,378 3286 38,680
Clusters 46 79 31 79
(2) Prop. Southern −0.0623 0.680*** −0.676 1.807 Prop. Southern black −0.939 0.418 −0.949 1.258
(0.317) (0.226) (1.444) (1.247) (6.423) (1.518) (3.239) (4.524)
Observations 6335 95,987 3286 36,217 Prop. Southern white 0.160 0.750** −0.461 2.088**
Clusters 46 74 31 61 (1.341) (0.355) (1.088) (0.919)
Observations 6335 95,987 3286 36,217
Clusters 46 74 31 61
Notes: Instrumental variables estimates. All specifications include indicators for age and education; specification (2) includes white and black metro-level percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of
education. Regressions weighted by the number of observations used to calculate metro-level covariates. Standard errors, clustered by metro area, reported in parentheses
“***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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3 National labor market analysis
In this section, I apply a national labor market approach to the Great Migration, treat-
ing the North as one aggregate labor market. An advantage of the national approach is
that it is less susceptible to the possibility of spatial arbitrage since attrition out of aggre-
gate labor markets is less common than internal migration within them. Although my
local labor markets evidence implies that blacks in the North did not respond to South-
ern immigration through outmigration, a comparison of local and national estimates for
blacks provides a unique opportunity to cross validate these approaches in a setting where
the empirical evidence against outmigration is supported by historical context. The wage
regressions discussed above do suggest white outmigration, and comparing the local and
national wage estimates for whites can clarify the extent to which they are attenuated by
spatial arbitrage. Though the purpose of my implementation of this approach is to com-
pare national and local estimates of the effect of Southern immigration on wages during
comparable time periods, it can also be viewed in part as a replication of Boustan (2009).
My implementation follows Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and, in the Great
Migration context, Boustan (2009). Because this methodology is well-developed in the
literature, I sketch the implementation in the text and present additional details in
Appendix 2. I assume that aggregate output in the North is produced using capital and
labor according to a Cobb-Douglas technology. The labor input L consists of education-
group-specific labor supplies Le, aggregated using a constant elasticity of substitution










Analogously, the Le consist of the labor Lex supplied by those with the same educa-
tion but different amounts of labor market experience, aggregated according to a CES
structure with weights θex and elasticity of substitution σex. The Lex consist of the labor
Lexr , r ∈ {b,w}, supplied by blacks and whites with the same education and experience,
aggregated using weights θexr and elasticity σr . Finally, the Lexr are CES-aggregated from
education-experience-race-birthplace supplies Lexri, i ∈ {s, n}, using weights θexri and
elasticity σi.
Under this nested-CES structure, the effects of immigration on wages can be expressed
in terms of skill-group-specific labor supplies, the wage-bill shares accruing to different
groups, and group-specific elasticities. Although they are not directly observable, under
the assumption that they are time-invariant, the elasticities can be estimated from time
series on group-specific wages and labor supply (in principle, the productivity weights
can vary over time).
3.1 Data
My national labor market results are also based on extracts of the US Census provided
by IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2015). To make the national and local estimates comparable, I
use the same sample restrictions for each approach (US-born black and white men liv-
ing in the North, aged 16–64, with nonzero wages in the year before enumeration). I
add the 1960 Census to the estimation sample in order to generate time-series variation
in wages and labor supply, which the national approach requires to estimate the elas-
ticities.16 In order to compare my results to those in Boustan (2009), who studies the
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1940–1970 period, I also use samples that include the 1970 Census. However, my focus
is on comparing my national and local estimates, for which the shorter sample is more
appropriate.
Table 2 shows that average education was low during the period that I study, making the
schemes used by studies of contemporary immigration to assign individuals to education
groups inappropriate. Instead, I divide the sample into five education groups: less than
fifth grade, fifth-to-eighth grade, some high school, high school, and greater than high
school. I impute labor market experience as age minus six minus the number of years of
schooling an individual in the midpoint of the education group would have received and
assign individuals to one of eight 5-year experience groups. See Appendix 2 for further
detail.
The most disaggregated labor nest is the education-experience-race-birthplace group.
In this nest, I measure labor supply as the number of individuals in the group and wages
as group-average annual wages (note that this allows me to capture adjustments to the
intensivemargin of labor supply). Labor supplies and wages for higher nests are calculated
as implied by the nested-CES structure (see Appendix 2).
3.2 Elasticity estimates


















I use this relationship to recover the native-immigrant elasticity of substitution, σi, by












+ uexrt , (2)
where w¯exrit is the average wage paid to members of an education-experience-race-
birthplace group, Lˆexrit is the (calculated) size of the group, λexr is an education-
experience-race-group fixed effect, λert is a decade-specific education-race-group fixed
effect, and λxrt is a decade-specific experience-race-group fixed effect. The fixed effects
are included to absorb as much variation as possible in the relative productivity terms.
Note that in these models, only within-education-experience-race group variation over
time in relative labor supply can be endogenous—this would require that, for example,
only in some year, black immigrants with a high school degree and 5 years of experience
supplied more labor than their native counterparts, or more immigrant than native blacks
with 5 years of experience completed high school, in response to a productivity shock
that favored immigrants, but black immigrants with different skills and otherwise-similar
white immigrants did not.17
Table 12 presents the estimates. To allow for the possibility that the immigrant-native
elasticity varies by race, I estimate separatemodels for blacks andwhites as well as amodel
that constrains the elasticity to be the same over a pooled sample of both races. Regardless
of the period examined or the racial composition of the sample, none of the coefficient
estimates are significantly different from zero, providing no indication of imperfect sub-
stitution between Southern- and Northern-born workers. These are the only parameters
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Table 12 Elasticity estimates (immigrant-native)
Sample 1940–1960 1940–1970
Whites −σ−1i −0.05 −0.05
(0.06) (0.04)
N 117 156
Blacks −σ−1i 0.05 0.02
(0.08) (0.05)
N 117 156
Pooled −σ−1i −0.04 −0.04
(0.06) (0.04)
N 234 311
Notes: Except where noted, wages and labor supplies are measured using all Northern labor. Standard errors for the estimates of
σi , σr , and σx are clustered by education-experience group (or race-education-experience groups for models that pool both
races); standard errors for σe are heteroskedasticity-robust. All regressions are weighted by the number of observations used to
construct the dependent variable
in my national labor market analysis for which I do not reject the null of perfect substi-
tution, despite being based on the largest samples and having some of the most precise
coefficient estimates.
A similar theoretical argument shows that the elasticity of substitution, σr , between












+ uext , (3)
where w¯exrt and Lˆexrt are education-experience-race group wages and labor supplies.
Based on the evidence that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes, I construct
the Lˆexrt as the sum of immigrant and native labor supplies within education-experience
groups in each decade.18 To account for potentially endogenous black-white relative labor
supply within education-experience groups, I use two instrumental variable strategies,
both based on the premise that Southern immigration shifts relative supply curves. The
first, following Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012), is the immigrant component
of black-white relative labor supply within education-experience groups. The second,
following Boustan (2009), is the ratio of blacks to whites among the national stock of
Southerners within education-experience groups (i.e., among all Southerners, regardless
of whether they have migrated North). The immigrant component instrument is appro-
priate if within-group labor supply is endogenous with respect to productivity shocks
that affect the North and South alike, since these shocks would not have attracted immi-
grants. The national stock instrument is more appropriate for productivity shocks local to
the North, which would be unlikely to elicit a labor-supply response among many South-
erners. Although my immigrant-native elasticity estimates imply that skill-group-average
wages should be calculated using all workers, I also estimate (3) using only natives’ wage to
allow for the possibility that immigrant-biased productivity shocks affected black-white
relative labor supply.
The results, given in Table 13, point to considerable imperfect substitution between
blacks and whites in both sample periods. In the 1940–1960 sample, the estimated coef-
ficients on relative labor supply cluster around −.2, or an elasticity of 5. Only when
the equation is estimated using the entire wage sample and the immigrant component









Table 13 Elasticity estimates (black-white)
1940–1960 1940–1970
Wage sample OLS IV (Immig. component) IV (National stock) OLS IV (Immig. component) IV (National stock)
All −σ−1r −0.22 −0.10 −0.20 −σ−1r −0.13 −0.05 −0.16
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
N 117 117 117 N 155 155 155
Natives −σ−1r −0.18 −0.19 −0.16 −σ−1r −0.14 −0.12 −0.16
(0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
N 117 117 117 N 156 155 156
Notes: “Immig. component” refers to the immigrant component of labor supply and “National stock” refers to the labor supply among all Southern-born workers (including those living in the North). Except where noted, wages and
labor supplies are measured using all Northern labor. Standard errors for the estimates of σi , σr , and σx are clustered by education-experience group (or race-education-experience groups for models that pool both races); standard
errors for σe are heteroskedasticity-robust. All regressions are weighted by the number of observations used to construct the dependent variable
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instrument to the native wage sample yields a significant estimate of −.19. When 1970
is added to the sample, the coefficient estimates are smaller in absolute value (between
−.13 and−.16), indicating a larger elasticity of substitution between black and white labor
during the 1960s. As in the shorter sample, for all but one of the estimates can perfect
substitution be rejected.19
Under a nested-CES structure, shocks to white education-experience-group labor sup-
plies that hold labor supplies in higher nest constant only affect whites’ wages if blacks
and whites are imperfect substitutes, implying that the black-white elasticity can be esti-
mated independently from samples of only whites or only blacks. To provide further
evidence on this elasticity, I estimate versions of (2) in racial-group-specific levels rather
than black-white ratios, reporting the results in Table 14. For both sample periods, the
coefficient estimates for whites (the coefficients on log labor supply) are larger in absolute
value than those obtained when the equation is estimated in black-white ratios, while the
implied coefficients for blacks (obtained by adding the coefficients on log labor supply
and black×log labor supply) are considerably smaller. This pattern, which is consistent
with greater endogeneity of black than white labor supply, explains why the coefficient
estimates are smaller when the equation is estimated in ratios: they represent a weighted
average of the black and white coefficients. Note that even the estimates obtained by
applying the immigrant component instrument to all whites’ wages are larger in abso-
lute value and significantly different from zero. As when the equation is estimated in
ratios, adding 1970 to the sample shrinks the estimated coefficients, implying greater
black-white substitutability. However, the effect of adding 1970 is smaller in Table 14. For
example, the coefficient estimated using OLS and all wages increases from −.25 to −.23,
a change more consistent with racial progress during the 1960s than the more severe
changes evident in Table 12. This difference may arise because, in 1970, black labor sup-
ply remained relatively endogenous but the black labor force was larger and distributed
over a greater number of education-experience cells, exacerbating the attenuation caused
by estimating the equation in ratios.
As I note in the introduction, although occupational segregation arising from discrim-
ination may have contributed to effective imperfect substitution between blacks and
whites, analysis of the Great Migration can still provide externally valid insight into the
effects of an influx of immigrants with a different skill mix than the native population.
Discrimination may also create the appearance of imperfect substitution if, as in Becker
(1971), heterogeneity in employers’ tastes for discrimination meant that blacks were paid
less in labor markets or skill groups containing more blacks. In this case, the Great Migra-
tion would only be informative about contemporary flows of immigrants who belong to
racial, ethnic, or other minorities. The race-specific elasticity estimates in Table 14 are
inconsistent with this hypothesis. If the estimated elasticities were an artifact of heteroge-
neous tastes for discrimination, we would expect them to be driven primarily by variation
in black labor supply and wages; we observe the opposite.
To estimate the elasticity of substitution, σx, between education-experience groups,
I use the (conservative) OLS estimates of (3) to compute the education-experience-
group×year labor supplies and average wages implied by the nested CES model. I then
regress (logs of ) these wages on education-time and experience-time fixed effects and log
labor supply by OLS and by IV using the immigrant component of labor supply. I use









Table 14 Race-specific estimates of σr
1940–1960 1940–1970
Wage sample Labor supply sample OLS IV (Immig. component) IV (National stock) OLS IV (Immig. component) IV (National stock)
All All log(L) −0.25 −0.17 −0.26 −0.23 −0.17 −0.22
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Black*log(L) 0.17 0.07 0.25 0.15 0.09 0.18
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
N 234 234 234 311 311 311
Native All log(L) −0.26 −0.18 −0.26 −0.23 −0.18 −0.22
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Black*log(L) 0.19 0.06 0.27 0.12 0.06 0.14
(0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
N 234 234 234 312 311 312
Notes: The estimating equation is logwexrt = λexr + λert + λext − σ 1w log Lexrt − (σ−1b − σ−1w )1r=b log Lexrt + uexrt . Immig. component refers to the immigrant component of labor supply and National stock refers to the labor supply
among all Southern-born workers (including those living in the North). Standard errors for the estimates of σi , σr , and σx are clustered by education-experience group (or race-education-experience groups for models that pool both
races). All regressions are weighted by the number of observations used to construct the dependent variable
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and average wages in order to recover the elasticity of substitution, σe, between educa-
tion groups from regressions of log wages on time fixed effects, education-group-specific
linear time trends and log labor supply, both by OLS and by IV using the immigrant
component instrument aggregated to the education-group level (Appendix 2 provides the
details and theoretical motivation for these procedures). The estimates from thesemodels
are presented in Table 15. My estimates of σ−1x lie in the in interval [.18, .26], compara-
ble to those in Welch (1979), Card and Lemieux (2001), Borjas (2003), Boustan (2009),
and Ottaviano and Peri (2012). There is more variation in estimates of σ−1e across the
literature; mine are in the interval [.21, .28], comparable to those in Boustan (2009) and
Ottaviano and Peri (2012), but larger than those in Borjas (2003) (time period differences
may help explain why I find different education groups more easily substitutable).
3.3 Wage impact results
Under the nested-CES production function, when immigrants and natives are perfect
substitutes and capital has fully adjusted to immigrant-induced labor supply shocks,
the effect of immigration into all education-experience-race groups (e′, x′, r′) on the














































where Lexrs/Lexrs is the proportional change in immigration to group (e, x, r), sexr is the
share of the wage bill accruing to skill group (e, x, r), sex is the share of the wage bill accru-
ing to the aggregate group with shared skills (e, x), and so on.20 Expression (4) clarifies the
channels through which immigration affects wages in a nested-CES economy: as long as
substitutability increases with nest depth, immigrants depress wages for those who share
their skills and increase wages for those who do not.21
I use (4) to compute the effects of Southern immigration from 1940–1960 and 1940–
1970 on wages in the North. Skill-group-specific proportional changes in immigration
Table 15 Elasticity estimates (education and experience)
1940–1960 1940–1970
OLS IV (Immig. component) OLS IV (Immig. component)
Experience −σ−1x −0.26 −0.20 −σ−1x −0.23 −0.18
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
N 117 117 N 155 155
Education −σ−1e −0.24 −0.28 −σ−1e −0.21 −0.25
(0.14) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05)
N 15 15 N 20 20
Notes: “Immig. component” refers to the immigrant component of labor supply and “National stock” refers to the labor supply
among all Southern-born workers (including those living in the North). Except where noted, wages and labor supplies are
measured using all Northern labor. Standard errors for the estimates of σi , σr , and σx are clustered by education-experience group
(or race-education-experience groups for models that pool both races); standard errors for σe are heteroskedasticity-robust. All
regressions are weighted by the number of observations used to construct the dependent variable
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are directly observable (I list them in Appendix 3: Table 22). To assess the sensitiv-
ity of wage-effect simulations to the racial elasticity of substitution, I use the values
of σr implied by both the OLS and national-stock IV estimates of (4) obtained using
the full wage sample. I use the IV estimates of σx and σe. While it was typical for a
Northern worker to have less than a high school education in 1940 (see Table 2), the
proportional changes in immigration were larger in more-educated skill groups, reflect-
ing increasing educational attainment over time. Using 1940 wage-bill shares to compute
(4) may therefore understate the effects of immigration over the 20- and 30-year peri-
ods that I analyze by underweighting skill groups that were initially small. A simple
solution is to weight skill groups by their wage-bill shares in 1950, the midpoint of
the shorter sample period, though I also report results obtained using 1940 shares. I
weight skill-group-specific effects by wage-bill shares in order to present education-
race, race, and overall average wage impacts (this weighting scheme is suggested by
Ottaviano and Peri (2012)).
I summarize the wage impact simulations in Table 16. When skill groups are weighted
by their 1940 wage-bill shares, the calculations imply that immigration between 1940
and 1960 decreased the average wage paid to black labor by about 14 % and had no
effect on the average white wage; the calculations are insensitive to whether the OLS
or IV estimates of σr are assumed. Using 1950 wage-bill shares, which put more weight
on skill groups with larger proportional changes in immigration, gives a decline for
blacks of about 20 % on average and a negligible increase for whites.22 Over the longer
period spanning 1940–1970, increases in substitutability of black for white labor off-
set increases in black immigration, resulting in average wage impacts similar to those
for the shorter period, regardless of the weighting scheme. When I use 1940 wage-bill
shares as weights, the average wage impact calculations are close to those reported by
Boustan (2009).
The average wage decline for blacks was driven by even larger declines among blacks
with at least some high school. Less-educated black labor aggregates, which received
Table 16 The effects of South-North migration on wages
1940–1960 1940–1970
1940 shares 1950 shares 1940 shares 1950 shares
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
White Overall 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Black Overall −0.14 −0.13 −0.22 −0.20 −0.09 −0.11 −0.19 −0.24
White Less than 5th grade 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05
5th–8th grade 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05
Some high school 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
High school degree 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
Greater than high school −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.03 −0.03 −0.01 −0.01
Black Less than 5th grade 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13
5th–8th grade −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
Some high school −0.33 −0.30 −0.40 −0.36 −0.22 −0.27 −0.30 −0.37
High school degree −0.43 −0.39 −0.53 −0.49 −0.46 −0.57 −0.67 −0.82
Greater than high school −0.31 −0.28 −0.28 −0.25 −0.39 −0.48 −0.36 −0.44
Notes: Columns labeled “OLS” use the OLS estimate of the elasticity of substitution between blacks and whites; columns labeled
“IV” use estimates of this elasticity obtained by instrumenting for relative labor supplies with relative supplies among the national
stock of Southerners. All other elasticities are taken from IV estimates based on the labor supplied within skill groups by immigrants.
“1940 shares” means that immigration and wage effects are weighted by 1940 wage bill shares, and similarly for “1950 shares”
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few Southern immigrants, saw trivial changes in wages. Because immigrants comprised
a small fraction of the white labor force, the proportional changes in white immigration
were relatively small, and the white immigrant and native skill distributions were broadly
similar, the effects of Southern immigration were small across all white labor aggregates.
For the same reasons, the Great Migration would have had an equally negligible impact
on blacks’ wages had black and white labor been perfectly substitutable.
4 Conclusions
Comparing local labor markets, I find that Southern immigration decreased the wages
paid to blacks working in the North substantially, an effect which was driven by com-
petition from Southern black immigrants. At the same time, I find no evidence that
immigrants of either race had any effect on whites’ wages in the North. These findings
are robust to several alternative, non-causal interpretations. Nor do I find evidence of an
outmigration response among native blacks to Southern immigration. Although I do find
evidence of outmigration among whites, my estimates do not imply that outmigration off-
set immigration entirely, suggesting that spatial arbitrage alone cannot explain the lack of
an apparent wage effect for whites.
My national labor market estimates are highly consistent with these findings. By 1950,
about 10 % of the Northern labor force consisted of Southern immigrants. The estimates
of my richest local labor markets regression specification implies that a 10 % increase
in the immigrant share of the labor force caused a 20 % decline in native blacks’ annual
wages. In my preferred national labor market simulation, immigration to the North
between 1940 and 1960 (or 1970) lead to a 20 % decline in blacks’ wages.23 Like the
local labor markets estimates, the national market simulations reveal that the effects of
Southern immigration on whites’ wages were negligible. These small simulated effects
provide additional evidence that spatial arbitrage does not explain the small wage regres-
sion coefficients for whites. They also emphasize the importance of imperfect substitution
between blacks and whites: had these groups been perfectly substitutable, the Great
Migration would have had little effect on the distribution of skill, and hence the wage
structure, in the North.
The magnitudes of the wage impacts that I estimate for blacks, and the mutual con-
cordance between my local and national estimates and my findings with Boustan’s, are
unusual compared to studies of foreign immigration to the contemporary USA. These
differences arise because of several factors that set the Great Migration apart from other
immigration episodes, making it a potentially informative counterfactual to contempo-
rary immigration. My wage-regression and structural estimates both suggest effective
imperfect substitution between blacks and whites, and the summary evidence and elastic-
ity estimates that I present support this conclusion. Because Southern immigrants were
disproportionately black relative to the native population of the North, this imperfect
substitution meant that the Great Migration altered the distribution of skill in the North
appreciably. In addition, since Southern immigrants and Northern natives were perfect
substitutes, these changes were not concentrated on existing immigrants. In contrast,
contemporary foreign immigrant and US native skill distributions are much more simi-
lar (Card 2009), as were the within-racial-group distributions of Southern immigrant and
Northern native skill during the Great Migration. If more Southern whites had moved
north, or if those that did had different skills than white natives, Southern immigration
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would have had a larger impact onNorthern whites’ wages. These counterfactual impacts,
however, are not well-identified from the actual variation in white immigration andwages,
demonstrating the need to examine multiple migration episodes in order to develop a
complete picture of the relationship between immigration and wages.
Mywage effect estimates for blacks demonstrate that immigration can, and did, alter the
wage structure substantially—that relative demand curves are downward sloping, even in
the long run. They also demonstrate that, when immigration does affect wages, its effects
can be identified by local labor markets comparisons and structural simulations of the
national economy. On the other hand, my estimates for whites show that some immigrant
flows do not affect wages—that, while relative demand is downward sloping, immigration
does not necessarily increase relative labor supply curves.
Endnotes
1 Tolnay (2003) provides an excellent overview.
2Although identifying the underlying cause of this racial difference in outmigration
behavior is beyond my scope, historical context suggests a natural explanation: that the
same social forces that contributed to segregation within cities (see Massey and Denton
1993) also operated at larger geographic scales during the GreatMigration period. As part
of my instrumental variables strategy, I show that Southern-born blacks shared the well-
known tendency of immigrants to move to areas where previous immigrants have settled
(see Bartel 1989), providing some evidence that preferences for the racial composition of
residential areas influenced blacks’ location decisions.
3Boustan et al. (2010), using a different identification strategy, also provide evidence
of a mobility response to immigration during this period (their pooled dataset consists
mostly of whites).
4Although the 1960 IPUMS does not identify MSAs and cannot be included in my local
labor markets analysis, I also include education statistics for 1960 since I do use data for
that year in the national labor market analysis below.
5The instrumental variables estimates therefore identify an average wage effect of
inflows of immigrants who would not have migrated absent existing enclaves, insofar as
these immigrants impact labor markets differently than others.
6I use 1920 settlement patterns for several reasons. First, the Great Migration did not
begin until roughly 1915, so prior to 1920 the number of Southern immigrants resid-
ing in the North is small. Second, metropolitan areas are only identified in the IPUMS
Census samples if they are sufficiently populous to meet confidentiality requirements,
so using earlier settlement patterns reduces the number of areas that can be matched to
lagged migration. Third, as Table 1 shows, many of the Southern immigrants living in
the North in 1940 were already present by 1935; immigrants living in the North in 1940
may therefore have selected into locations on the basis of local economic conditions dur-
ing the 1930s, so predicted migration based on 1930 settlement patterns may be more
contaminated with selection effects.
7Because the number of Southern immigrants in the North was still small in 1920, this
is not much of a concern (see Tolnay et al. 2005). The period that I study (1940–1970)
is part of the larger second wave of the Great Migration. Nevertheless, including lagged
wages restores the validity of the instrument even if the small waves of early immigrants
exerted a strong impact on Northern labor markets.
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8This is in contrast to models of skill-group-specific wages as a function of skill-group-
specific immigration, which only identify what Ottaviano and Peri (2012) call the “direct
partial effect” of immigration (Dustmann et al. 2016, make a similar point).
9I use individual-level regressions for efficiency (Lang and Gottschalk 1996) and to
ensure that the standard errors appropriately reflect the removal of variation in the
dependent variables explained by the included individual-level covariates (Dumont et al.
2005).
10The standard errors for the metro-level estimates are comparable to, and in many
cases smaller than, the clustered standard errors for the microdata regressions.
11Peri and Sparber (2011), investigating why different tests for spatial arbitrage in the
contemporary US lead to different conclusions, use simulated data to assess the perfor-
mance of different specifications of internal migration behavior. My specification is a
variation on their preferred one that uses microdata and models gross, rather than net,
outmigration.
12A back-of-the-envelope calculation confirms this intuition. Replacing the recent
immigrant share with the total immigrant share and estimating specification (2) using the
1950 data produces a coefficient of about 0.06 for native whites. Since recent immigrants
comprised roughly 15 % of the total immigrant population in 1950, if this coefficient
only reflected recent immigration, the implied coefficient on the recent immigrant share
would be 0.4 (= .06/.15). The actual coefficient is about 1.4, implying that only roughly
30 % of the 1949–1950 native outmigration occurred as a response to immigrants who
arrived during this period.
Also note that if the coefficients are interpreted as the within period response to immi-
gration, they definitely overstate the outmigration response since some of the observed
outmigration must be a response to pre-period immigration if outmigration occurs with
a lag. If they are interpreted as the total response to immigration, they will overstate the
response if immigration is slowing (which it was during sample period) since there will
be more observed outmigration in response to previous immigration than unobserved
(due to truncation) outmigration in response to recent immigration. An alternative spec-
ification would include both the stock and flow of immigrants—such a specification is
challenging to estimate since (i) enclaving behavior induces a strong correlation between
the stock and the flow and (ii) IV estimation requires separate instruments for the stock
and the flow.
13A natural question is why the white outmigration response was large if the wage
effects were small. One possibility is that there were short-run effects which are not well-
identified by either the local or national approach. Another is that white immigration had
a greater effect on employment than wages. Another still is that white natives moved in
response to perceived effects which never materialized.
14Another possibility is that the state-specific patterns are measured with more error,
attenuating the IV estimates towards the OLS ones.
15The residuals are obtained from projections onto individual and area covariates,
including lagged average wages. For the IV plot, the projection of actual onto predicted
immigration is used in place of immigration itself.
16I do not use this period for the local labor markets analysis because MSA-level data
are not publicly available for 1960.
17Also note that the estimated average impact of immigration on wages in higher nests
will not be affected by an overstated immigrant-native elasticity.
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18Across years, the average education-experience-race cell is constructed from 115
observations for blacks and 1,868 observations for whites.
19Boustan (2009), studying the 1940–1970 period, obtains somewhat smaller estimates,
which I can closely-replicate by adopting her sample restrictions (including foreign-born
and other nonwhitemen, excluding the self-employed, those enrolled in school, and those
living in group quarters) and experience imputation scheme. As I show below, however,
the estimated effects of Southern immigration are not sensitive to small differences in
the assumed black-white elasticity of substitution; the differences between our estimates
appear to be driven by differences in the weights used to compute wage changes.
In contrast, Borjas et al. (2010) find no evidence of imperfect substitution in the period
spanning 1960–2000. The pattern of elasticities that increase with time is consistent with
black-white relative progress during the 20th Century.
20Ottaviano and Peri (2012, Appendix A1) sketch a proof. Here I provide another for the









its price is normalized to one. Differentiating the marginal product condition for profit
maximization gives ∂ logwi/∂ log Lj = (1/σ)(∂ log L/∂Lj). Let c ≡ c (L(L1, . . . , LI),w)
be the minimal cost of producing L(L1, . . . , LI) units of output when wages are w.
Because production is constant returns to scale, c = c(1,w)L(L1, . . . , LI). Since output
is the numeraire, c(1,w) = 1 in competitive equilibrium. Taking logs, ∂ log c/∂ log Lj =
∂ log L/∂ log Lj. We also have that ∂ log c/∂ log Lj = (∂c/∂Lj)/(c/Lj). Since profit max-
imization implies that ∂c/∂Lj = (∂c/∂L)(∂L/∂Lj) = wj in a competitive equilibrium
where output is the numeraire, ∂ log c/∂ log Lj = wjLj/c = sj. Thus, ∂ logwi/∂ log Li =
(1/σ)(∂ log L/∂Lj) = sj/σ .
21Also note that the long-run effects of immigration are necessarily distributional, at
least if capital is perfectly mobile—because production is CRS, capital investments will
completely offset changes to the productivity of (and hence the remuneration paid to)
aggregate labor, leaving the average wage unchanged.
22However, since I assume the larger black-white elasticities implied by the coefficients
in Tables 12 and 14, these calculations are conservative.
23These estimates are not directly comparable since my wage regressions relate wages
to immigrant stocks while my simulations relate changes in wages to immigrant flows.
However, since few Southern blacks lived in the North before 1915, the 1950 stock of
immigrants is also roughly the 1915–1950 flow, providing a basis for comparison.
Appendix 1
Local labor markets appendix
Sample and variable construction
My local labor markets analysis draws on 1 % extracts of the 1940 and 1950 US Censuses,
provided by IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2015). Note that the 1950 Census only asked a subset
of households wage information, so the regression samples for that decade are smaller. I
use the Eichenlaub et al. (2010) definition of the “South”, classifying Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia as Southern and all other states as Northern.
My sample consists of US-born black and white men, aged 16–64, who reported
nonzero earnings and lived in theNorth at the time of enumeration. I define labormarkets
as metropolitan statistical areas. Although the 1940 Census did not use an MSA concept,
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IPUMS identifies areas in the 1940 Census that fall within 1950 MSA boundaries and are
sufficiently populated to meet confidentiality requirements (Ruggles et al. 2015). Blacks
living in the North were clustered into a relatively small number of MSAs. To eliminate
the possibility of influential outlierMSAs consisting of only a few black men, I dropMSAs
with fewer than 10 black men meeting the other sample criteria. Appendix 3: Table 18
lists the metropolitan areas used in the black regression samples for each year.
I use the CPI weights supplied by IPUMS to inflate all wage variables to 1999 dollars.
Annual wages consist of all wage income during the year and weekly wages are annual
wages divided by weeks worked.
Some of the covariates that I use are MSA-level averages. In constructing these
variables, I weight each observation by the person weights supplied by IPUMS.
Misspecified lagged dependent variables and fixed-effects models
Guryan (2001) shows that, when x is a serially uncorrelated treatment indicator, estimates
from lagged dependent variables and fixed effects specifications bound the treatment
effect when the data-generating process is unknown. I extend his argument to the case
of serially correlated treatments. I also compare the biases of models with and with-
out lagged dependent variables when the data-generating processes exhibits permanent
unobserved heterogeneity. I focus on the simplified case where the treatment effect is zero
under the null hypothesis in order to emphasize the bias due to misspecification. I assume
that all variables are area-level means with individual covariates (and other area-level
covariates) partialled out.
Suppose that x has no causal effect, so that the value of y in area j evolves according to
the data-generating process
yjt = aj + ejt ,
with E(ejt|aj) = 0, implying that yjt = yjt−1 + ejt − ejt−1.
If the regression is misspecified as including the lagged dependent variable, i.e., yjt =




= Cov(yjt−1 + ejt − ejt−1, x˜jt)Var(x˜jt)
= Cov(ejt − ejt−1, xjt − γ1(aj + ejt−1))Var(x˜jt) = γ1
σ 2e
Var(x˜jt)




where x˜jt = xjt − γ0 − γ1yjt−1 is the residual from a population regression of xjt on yjt−1
and σ 2e is the variance of ejt , which is assumed to be iid across j and t. If x is positively
correlated with a, then β∗LDV > 0.
Now suppose the data-generating process is
yjt = δyjt−1 + ejt
with δ < 1, but the model is misspecified as yjt = βxjt + aj + ujt . In addition, suppose
that over short periods of time the process by which xjt evolves can be described by xjt =
λxjt−1 + rjt , with λ > 1 (to reflect the accumulation of immigrants over time) and r is
white noise. In this case, the probability limit of βˆ is
Gardner IZA Journal of Migration  (2016) 5:22 Page 37 of 45
β∗FD =
Cov(yjt − yjt−1, xjt − xjt−t)
Var(xjt − xjt−t)
= Cov(yjt , xjt) − Cov(yjt , xjt−1) − Cov(yjt−1, xjt) + Cov(yjt−1, xjt−1)Var(xjt − xjt−1)
= (δλ)
t−1(λδ − λ − δ + 1)σxa
Var(xjt − xjt−1) =
(δλ)t−1[ (λ − 1)(δ − 1)] σxa
Var(xjt − xjt−1) < 0,
where σxa = Cov(x0, yj0) is positive by assumption.
We thus have that β∗FD < β = 0 < β∗LDV.
A similar result allows us to compare the OLS and lagged dependent variable estimators
when there is permanent heterogeneity. If the data-generating process is yjt = aj + ejt but




= Cov(aj, xjt)Var(xjt) > 0.








Note that, since σ 2e /Var(yjt−1) ≤ 1 by definition, this condition is testable. In my
dataset, Var(xjt)/Var(x˜jt) ≈ 1.
Appendix 2
National labor market appendix
Sample and variable construction
The education categories that I use are less than fifth grade (less than 5 years of schooling),
fifth-to-eighth grade (between 5 and 8 years), some high school (between 9 and 11 years),
high school (12 years), and greater than high school (greater than 12 years). I assume that
those with less than a fifth grade education spend 2.5 years in school, those with a fifth-
to-eighth grade education spend 7.5, those with some high school spend 10, those with
a high school degree spend 12, and those with more than a high school degree spend
13.5. Imputed experience is age, minus six, minus years spent in school. I then assign
individuals to one of eight 5-year experience groups (one to five, six to ten, etc.) and drop
individuals with less than one or more than 40 years of experience.
With my sample restrictions, there are no individuals in the sample in the lowest
education-experience group. I then have 39 education experience groups for a total of 234
education-experience-race-year observations (which include natives and immigrants) or
312 observations when 1970 is included in the sample. Mymeasure of labor supply within
education-experience-race cells for each year is the sum of the Census sampling weights
provided by IPUMS andmy wagemeasure is the sampling-weighted average annual wage.
Implementation details
The aggregate production function is Y = ALαK1−α where L is successively CES-nested
as described in the main text. The competitive wage for a member of group (e, x, r, i) is





























+ log θexri − 1
σi
log Lexri,


















which motivates specification (3) with w¯exrt = wexrnt · (Lexrnt/Lexrt)+wexrst · (Lexrst/Lexrt)
for r ∈ {b,w}.24
The model implies that














log Let+log θex− 1
σx
log Lext ,
so that σx can be recovered from the regression specification
log w¯ext = λet + λex − 1
σx
log Lˆext + uext . (6)
To construct the Lˆext and w¯ext , I assume that θexw + θexb = 1 and estimate





































and w¯ext = w¯exwt · (Lˆexwt/Lˆext) + w¯exbt · (Lˆexbt/Lˆext), where the fixed effects and elasticity
estimates are taken from the OLS estimates of (2) applied to the entire sample.
Finally, the model implies that








log Lt + log θet − 1
σe
log Let ,
which suggests that σe can be recovered from estimates of
log w¯et = λt +
∑
e
κe · t − 1
σe
log Lˆet + uet . (7)
Following Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012), I assume that the θex are time
invariant (in order to recover them separately from the aggregate time terms in (6)) with∑

























Table 17 Southern immigration and metro-average annual wages
OLS IV
1940 1950 1940 1950
Specification Black White Black White Black White Black White
(1) Prop. Southern 0.265 0.449** −0.485* 0.450*** −0.0345 0.294 −0.782*** 0.483***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.25) (0.15) (0.37) (0.24) (0.24) (0.18)
Observations 27 93 23 100 26 80 22 80
(2) Prop. Southern 0.0215 0.369** −0.765 0.449*** −0.837*** 0.286 −0.796* 0.454**
(0.45) (0.15) (0.48) (0.15) (0.27) (0.20) (0.43) (0.23)
Observations 27 87 23 72 26 75 22 62
(3) Prop. Southern −0.977*** 0.172 −1.488*** 0.251
(0.33) (0.13) (0.35) (0.22)
Observations 23 87 22 75
(4) Prop. Southern −1.243** 0.251** −1.783*** 0.294
(0.51) (0.10) (0.46) (0.27)
Observations 23 67 22 59
Notes: Dependent variable is metro-average residuals from a regression of log annual wages on indicators for educational attainment and age. Specification (2) includes white and black metro-level percent employed in
manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of education; specification (3) includes the metro level average dependent variable, lagged one decade; specification (4) includes metro-level average variables and a lagged mean
dependent variable. Regressions weighted by the number of observations used to calculate metro-level covariates. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses









Table 18Metro areas used in black regressions
1940 1950
Prop. Southern # of natives Prop. Southern # of natives
Metro All Black White Black White All Black White Black White
Atlantic City, NJ 0.094 0.085 0.009 23 181 0.030 0.022 0.008 13 54
Baltimore, MD 0.149 0.083 0.066 237 2062 0.213 0.116 0.097 85 735
Boston, MA-NH 0.015 0.007 0.007 41 4582 0.032 0.012 0.020 18 1725
Charleston, WV 0.161 0.057 0.104 26 543 0.113 0.059 0.054 14 204
Chicago, IL 0.095 0.062 0.032 155 9003 0.149 0.102 0.047 105 3308
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH/KY/IN 0.266 0.082 0.184 30 996 0.281 0.085 0.196 12 390
Cleveland, OH 0.094 0.065 0.029 37 2368 0.113 0.085 0.028 29 877
Columbus, OH 0.106 0.061 0.045 38 799 0.098 0.043 0.055 19 349
Dayton-Springfield, OH 0.137 0.056 0.082 37 872 0.259 0.106 0.153 11 323
Des Moines, IA 0.027 0.005 0.023 11 418
Detroit, MI 0.157 0.073 0.085 62 4226 0.245 0.135 0.110 51 1616
Indianapolis, IN 0.176 0.077 0.099 39 911 0.167 0.063 0.104 18 311
Kansas City, MO-KS 0.139 0.057 0.083 96 1311 0.179 0.081 0.098 21 492
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.171 0.024 0.147 44 4737 0.200 0.049 0.151 29 2246
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 0.020 0.007 0.013 15 1898
New Haven-Meriden, CT 0.018 0.011 0.007 15 977
New York-Northeastern NJ 0.066 0.045 0.020 427 19203 0.083 0.058 0.025 235 6835
Omaha, NE/IA 0.061 0.034 0.027 11 545 0.077 0.027 0.050 10 184
Philadelphia, PA/NJ 0.087 0.064 0.024 263 5729 0.128 0.094 0.033 136 2067
Pittsburgh, PA 0.061 0.044 0.017 79 4007 0.064 0.050 0.015 39 1436
St. Louis, MO-IL 0.131 0.070 0.061 97 2805 0.168 0.096 0.072 45 978
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 0.100 0.011 0.089 18 2719 0.202 0.059 0.143 13 1204
Seattle-Everett, WA 0.129 0.030 0.099 10 458
Topeka, KS 0.068 0.029 0.039 11 182
Trenton, NJ 0.084 0.073 0.011 12 147
Washington, DC/MD/VA 0.354 0.151 0.202 232 1128 0.361 0.148 0.213 106 459
Wheeling, WV/OH 0.049 0.028 0.022 14 692
Wilmington, DE/NJ/MD 0.050 0.017 0.032 37 353









Table 19 First-stage regressions
Individual covariates Individual and metro-level covariates
1940 1950 1940 1950
Dependent variable Instrument(s) Black White Black White Black White Black White
Prop. Southern Predicted Prop. Southern 0.544*** 0.514*** 0.453*** 0.372*** 0.559*** 0.532*** 0.289*** 0.358***
(0.0724) (0.0739) (0.0778) (0.0852) (0.0647) (0.0618) (0.0803) (0.0697)
Observations 2081 104,029 1029 39,219 2081 101,339 1029 36,413
R-squared 0.852 0.606 0.628 0.272 0.932 0.772 0.836 0.570
Clusters 26 80 22 80 26 75 22 62
Prop. Southern black Predicted Prop. Southern black 0.322*** 0.471*** 0.300*** 0.376*** 0.313*** 0.469*** 0.233*** 0.329***
(0.0829) (0.0918) (0.0520) (0.0733) (0.0985) (0.0653) (0.0697) (0.0546)
Predicted Prop. Southern white 0.115 −0.0522 0.0676 0.0165 0.0863 −0.00589 0.0345 0.0206
(0.0773) (0.0518) (0.0411) (0.0569) (0.0538) (0.0563) (0.0401) (0.0523)
Observations 2081 104,029 1029 39,219 2081 101,339 1029 36,413
R-squared 0.834 0.732 0.555 0.452 0.933 0.833 0.877 0.677
Clusters 26 80 22 80 26 75 22 62
Prop. Southern white Predicted Prop. Southern black −0.197 −0.289 −0.257 −0.413** −0.616*** −0.209 −0.416*** −0.279**
(0.139) (0.175) (0.158) (0.173) (0.182) (0.126) (0.142) (0.105)
Predicted Prop. Southern white 0.748*** 0.874*** 0.725*** 0.807*** 1.018*** 0.779*** 0.685*** 0.653***
(0.110) (0.187) (0.109) (0.159) (0.131) (0.127) (0.102) (0.115)
Observations 2081 104,029 1029 39,219 2081 101,339 1029 36,413
R-squared 0.879 0.717 0.779 0.594 0.957 0.799 0.893 0.720
Clusters 26 80 22 80 26 75 22 62
Notes: All specifications include indicators for age and education; metro-level covariates include white and black percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of education. Standard errors, clustered by
metro area, reported in parentheses









Table 20Weekly wages and immigration
OLS IV
1940 1950 1940 1950
Specification Black White Black White Black White Black White
(1) Prop. Southern −0.301 0.164 −0.415 0.396** −0.579 −0.259 −0.940** 0.120
(0.197) (0.307) (0.294) (0.153) (0.362) (0.333) (0.466) (0.241)
Observations 2106 107,104 1029 40,751 2080 103,986 1015 38,839
Clusters 27 93 23 100 26 80 22 80
(2) Prop. Southern −0.455 0.324 −0.582 0.379** −0.832*** 0.0717 −0.919 0.0892
(0.323) (0.256) (0.422) (0.181) (0.282) (0.286) (0.592) (0.234)
Observations 2106 104,167 1029 37,065 2080 101,299 1015 36,055
Clusters 27 87 23 72 26 75 22 62
(3) Prop. Southern −0.929*** 0.164* −1.221*** 0.159
(0.257) (0.0860) (0.258) (0.185)
Observations 1029 38,933 1015 26,290
Clusters 23 87 22 22
(4) Prop. Southern −1.129*** 0.145* −1.256*** −0.0631
(0.265) (0.0767) (0.425) (0.177)
Observations 1029 36,114 1015 26,290
Clusters 23 67 22 22
Notes: All specifications include indicators for age and education; specification (2) includes white and black metro-level percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of education; specification (3) includes
the metro level average dependent variable, lagged one decade; specification (4) includes metro-level average variables and a lagged mean dependent variable. Regressions weighted by the number of observations used to calculate
metro-level covariates. Standard errors, clustered by metro area, reported in parentheses









Table 21Weekly wages and race-specific immigration
OLS IV
1940 1950 1940 1950
Specification Black White Black White Black White Black White
(1) Prop. Southern black −1.066 1.328** −1.294 1.091*** −1.501** 0.164 −3.607*** 0.262
(0.722) (0.523) (1.076) (0.241) (0.696) (0.843) (1.197) (0.444)
Prop. Southern white 0.0966 −0.212 0.0705 0.0776 −0.0224 −0.526** 0.718 −0.0536
(0.392) (0.222) (0.332) (0.131) (0.470) (0.257) (0.564) (0.141)
Observations 2106 107,104 1029 40,751 2080 103,986 1015 38,839
Clusters 27 93 23 100 26 80 22 80
(2) Prop. Southern black −0.938 1.198*** −2.206 1.007*** −2.887** 0.569 −2.626** 0.178
(1.236) (0.427) (1.338) (0.336) (1.316) (0.525) (1.289) (0.435)
Prop. Southern white −0.273 −0.0875 0.0998 0.0364 0.0964 −0.272 0.443 0.00247
(0.617) (0.247) (0.394) (0.173) (0.638) (0.290) (0.412) (0.233)
Observations 2106 104,167 1029 37,065 2080 101,299 1015 36,055
Clusters 27 87 23 72 26 75 22 62
(3) Prop. Southern black −1.279** 0.685*** −2.050*** 0.374*
(0.616) (0.180) (0.633) (0.200)
Prop. Southern white −0.693 −0.0290 −0.583 −0.0911
(0.451) (0.0631) (0.571) (0.115)
Observations 1029 38,933 1015 37,712
Clusters 23 87 22 75
(4) Prop. Southern black −3.193*** 0.466** −2.518*** 0.189
(0.738) (0.213) (0.811) (0.210)
Prop. Southern white −0.374 −0.0113 −0.128 0.00415
(0.329) (0.105) (0.374) (0.153)
Observations 1029 36,114 1015 35,295
Clusters 23 67 22 59
Notes: All specifications include indicators for age and education; specification (2) includes white and black metro-level percent employed in manufacturing, percent farming, and average years of education; specification (3) includes
the metro level average dependent variable, lagged one decade; specification (4) includes metro-level average variables and a lagged mean dependent variable. Regressions weighted by the number of observations used to calculate
metro-level covariates. Standard errors, clustered by metro area, reported in parentheses
“***”, “**”, and “*” denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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Table 22 Changes in South-North migration
Proportional change Proportional change
(1940–1960) (1940–1970)
Education group Experience group White Black White Black
Less than 5th grade 6–10 0.10 −0.50 −0.15 −1.00
11–15 −0.02 0.20 −0.48 −0.75
16–20 0.58 0.24 −0.19 −0.65
21–25 0.58 0.11 −0.23 −0.71
26–30 0.90 0.08 0.33 −0.69
31–35 0.25 0.14 0.30 −0.58
36–40 0.98 0.21 1.21 −0.40
5th–8th grade 1–5 2.14 3.05 2.63 5.69
6–10 0.04 0.13 −0.39 −0.60
11–15 0.10 0.01 −0.37 −0.61
16–20 0.25 0.09 −0.34 −0.65
21–25 0.09 0.20 −0.24 −0.47
26–30 0.15 0.19 −0.02 −0.37
31–35 0.62 0.81 0.63 0.33
36–40 0.83 1.19 0.72 0.78
Some high school 1–5 3.06 1.66 4.62 2.33
6–10 0.83 1.92 0.70 1.36
11–15 0.63 1.82 0.46 1.59
16–20 0.88 2.72 0.59 2.41
21–25 1.50 3.60 1.22 3.11
26–30 2.11 4.79 2.58 6.97
31–35 2.02 4.49 3.60 9.39
36–40 3.87 5.48 5.94 11.88
High school degree 1–5 1.95 3.04 2.56 4.38
6–10 1.18 2.29 2.22 4.47
11–15 1.09 4.62 1.87 11.38
16–20 1.92 4.34 3.09 9.02
21–25 3.32 5.32 4.21 6.46
26–30 3.28 6.31 5.26 16.27
31–35 2.63 8.73 6.42 14.33
36–40 2.75 4.20 8.65 8.27
Greater than high school 1–5 1.72 2.64 5.74 6.52
6–10 1.94 3.54 3.81 8.23
11–15 1.84 4.60 3.00 8.50
16–20 2.24 2.71 3.50 6.20
21–25 1.78 2.34 3.12 4.29
26–30 1.31 2.19 4.74 4.89
31–35 1.63 1.76 4.36 4.55
36–40 1.90 2.35 5.78 4.18
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